Why common law is sceptical of philosophy

At last November’s F A Mann Lecture, Justice Philip Sales of the UK Supreme Court offered a compelling philosophical framework for understanding how purpose shapes the creation and interpretation of law. Drawing on the works of American jurist Lon Fuller and philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, Sales illuminated why purposive analysis remains indispensable across the legal landscape.

Sales’s thesis rests on two philosophical pillars that deserve attention. The first is Fuller’s conception of law as “the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules”. This frames purpose not merely as an interpretive tool, but as constitutive of law itself. The second is Wittgenstein’s analysis of language as inherently purpose-driven, with meaning emerging from use rather than from fixed referents.

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