When Rescuers Become the Accused: SC Quashes Vexatious FIR Against Activists

In a judgment that reinforces the protective canopy of constitutional justice over civil society workers, the Supreme Court in this case quashed criminal proceedings initiated against activists of “Guria,” an NGO known for its anti-trafficking interventions. The case an unsettling example of state machinery turning against its allies required the Court to recalibrate the contours of Section 482 CrPC and dismantle charges under Sections 186 and 353 IPC, which had been weaponized to punish overzealous rescue efforts.

The appellants, foot soldiers in Guria’s fight against bonded and child labour, had accompanied a team of state labour officials on a government-authorised inspection of a brick kiln in Varanasi, following allegations of exploitation. What followed was bureaucratic discord turned criminal allegation.

According to the FIR, the activists “obstructed” the government team and forcibly removed labourers before their statements could be recorded, thereby interfering with public servants in discharge of duty a claim categorically denied by the appellants, who argued they acted in the best interest of the victims and with full disclosure to the District Magistrate.

The High Court’s refusal to quash the chargesheet was terse and devoid of factual scrutiny, relying instead on a stock line that disputed questions of fact could not be examined under Section 482 CrPC. The Supreme Court, however, took a more exacting view. In doing so, it laid down a clarifying jurisprudence that criminal proceedings, even if facially compliant with procedure, must pass the threshold of legitimacy when tested against the factual matrix and statutory prerequisites.

On merits, the Court dissected the ingredients of the alleged offences. It found that neither “assault” nor “criminal force,” as required under Section 353 IPC, were discernible from the prosecution materials. There was no suggestion of threat, use of force, or even hostile gestures by the appellants. Similarly, under Section 186 IPC, mere deviation from an official’s preferred procedure here, the choice to record statements at the police station instead of on-site did not amount to voluntary obstruction with requisite mens rea.

More importantly, the Court exposed deep procedural flaws. Section 186 being a non-cognizable offence required prior sanction under Section 155(2) CrPC missing in this case.

Cognizance taken on a police report also contravened Section 195 CrPC, which mandates that a complaint under Section 186 must come from the public servant concerned or a superior. Here, the complaint originated not from the supposed aggrieved officer but from the police, violating both the letter and spirit of the procedural law.

The judgment gains further depth when viewed against the backcloth of institutional hostility. The Additional Labour Commissioner’s report, annexed to the counter affidavit, went so far as to accuse the appellants of bribing labourers to give false statements allegations completely unsupported by evidence.

Such conduct, the Court noted, underscored the mala fide genesis of the FIR and bolstered the claim of abuse of process.

The ruling thus accomplishes three things at once: it restores the liberty of individuals who acted under a bonafide belief of social duty; it asserts that Section 482 CrPC is not a procedural backbench but a frontline defence against state overreach; and it confirms that legal safeguards in Sections 155 and 195 CrPC are not technicalities, but essential bulwarks of due process.

In a legal climate where state functionaries often find it easier to target the messenger than confront systemic failure, Umashankar Yadav is a reminder that the judiciary remains the final sentinel of civil liberties.

That rescuers of trafficked children can be accused of obstruction underscores the perilous tightrope civil society actors walk and the urgent need for judicial vigilance to keep that rope from becoming a noose.