SC Flags Gaps in 25% School Quota, Says Poor Children Are Being Shut Out of Education

The Supreme Court’s decision in Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra (2026 INSC 56) is a quiet but profound reminder that the right to education under Article 21A is not meant to exist only on paper.

It is a judgment that speaks less about an individual grievance that has already become infructuous, and more about a systemic constitutional failure that continues to deny children from weaker and disadvantaged sections meaningful access to schooling promised by law.

What's The Matter?

At the heart of the case lay a familiar story.

A parent from an economically marginal background sought admission for his children under the 25 per cent quota mandated by Section 12(1)(c) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009. Despite information showing vacant seats and even a recommendation from education authorities acknowledging his eligibility, the admission never materialised.

The High Court dismissed his writ petition, faulting him for not following the online procedure.

By the time the matter reached the Supreme Court, years had passed and effective relief was no longer possible.

Yet, the Court refused to let the case die as a mere technicality.

What The Court Said?

The Bench of the Supreme Court of India chose instead to treat the petition as an opportunity for precedent-making. In doing so, it reframed the issue not as an isolated administrative lapse, but as a structural denial of a fundamental right.

The judgment underscores that Article 21A is a positive constitutional right, imposing correlative duties on multiple actors: the State, local authorities, neighbourhood schools, parents, and teachers.

When any one of these duty-bearers fails, the constitutional promise itself is compromised.

What makes the ruling particularly significant is its clear articulation of the constitutional philosophy behind Section 12(1)(c).

The Court situates the 25 per cent reservation in private unaided neighbourhood schools within the larger values of equality, dignity and fraternity. Education, the Court reminds us, is not merely about access to classrooms but about shared spaces.

The idea that children from vastly different socio-economic backgrounds should sit in the same classroom is not accidental; it is a deliberate constitutional strategy to dismantle entrenched hierarchies at their roots. In this sense, the neighbourhood school becomes a site of social integration, not segregation.

The judgment also exposes the deep disconnect between statutory intent and administrative practice. The insistence on online-only admission procedures, the Court notes, ignores the reality of digital illiteracy, language barriers and lack of institutional support.

A right that can only be accessed by navigating opaque portals, without help-desks or clear grievance redressal, ceases to be a right in any meaningful sense.

The Court is particularly critical of the tendency of authorities and courts alike to declare such cases “infructuous”, thereby normalising denial through delay.

Equally important is the Court’s engagement with the role of oversight institutions. While recognising the efforts of the National and State Commissions for Protection of Child Rights in issuing standard operating procedures, the Court makes it clear that guidelines without statutory backing are insufficient. In the absence of enforceable rules, duty-bearers remain unaccountable and judicial review becomes uncertain.

The direction to frame subordinate legislation under Section 38 of the RTE Act is therefore not a routine administrative instruction, but a constitutional necessity.

Without binding rules governing admissions, transparency, assistance and grievance redressal, Section 12 risks becoming a dead letter.

The tone of the judgment is also noteworthy for its institutional introspection. The Court acknowledges that the judiciary itself has a role to play in ensuring effective and timely remedies.

Access to justice, particularly for marginalised parents asserting their children’s educational rights, cannot be reduced to procedural formalism. Courts, the judgment stresses, must “walk that extra mile” when fundamental rights of children are at stake.

The promise of Article 21A is fulfilled by ensuring that the doors of those schools are genuinely open to every child, especially those for whom education is the only ladder out of inherited disadvantage.

If implemented in spirit, the directions issued in this case have the potential to transform Section 12 from a contested provision into a lived reality, and to restore education to its rightful place as a tool of equality rather than exclusion.