Lawful Termination of Leases for Illegal Subletting:SGHC

The decision of the Singapore Magistrate’s Court in Century Housing Services Pte Ltd v Koh Chiep Chong (Xu Jiecong) offers a clear and timely reaffirmation of orthodox landlord tenant principles in an era where co-living business models increasingly test the limits of traditional tenancy agreements.

At its core, the case turns on a deceptively simple question: whether a tenant can rely on past informal arrangements and commercial practice to override clear contractual prohibitions against subletting.

What's The Matter?

The claimant, a company operating co-living residential spaces, had leased a condominium unit and, consistent with its business model, partitioned the premises and rented out individual rooms to multiple occupants.

When the defendant purchased the property subject to the existing tenancy, he moved swiftly to terminate the lease on the basis of illegal subletting.

The claimant characterised this as wrongful repudiation and sought damages, arguing that the previous landlord had consented to its operating model and had waived strict compliance with the tenancy terms over several years.

What Court Said?

The Court rejected this attempt to convert commercial convenience into contractual entitlement. Emphasising that a tenancy agreement is first and foremost a contract, District Judge James Leong held that the starting point must be the express wording of the lease.

Clause 2(k), which prohibited assigning, subletting or parting with possession of “the premises or any part thereof” without written consent, was found to be clear and unambiguous.

The claimant’s practice of renting out rooms individually constituted subletting, and the absence of written consent was fatal to its case.

Significantly, the Court dismissed the claimant’s argument that the clause only restricted subletting of the entire unit and not room-by-room arrangements.

Such an interpretation, the Court observed, strained both language and logic.

If the claimant’s business depended on subletting individual rooms, the burden lay on it to negotiate an express contractual carve-out.

The failure to do so across three successive tenancy agreements could not later be cured by invoking implied permission or commercial custom.

Equally instructive is the Court’s treatment of waiver and acquiescence.

Even assuming that the previous landlord had tolerated or even approved the claimant’s conduct, the tenancy agreement contained a non-waiver clause expressly preserving the landlord’s right to enforce contractual terms notwithstanding earlier indulgence.

The defendant, having stepped into the shoes of the former landlord, was not bound to continue any informal waiver, particularly in the absence of documentary evidence

The Court thus reinforced the principle that waiver must be clearly established and cannot lightly be inferred, especially where parties have expressly agreed otherwise.

The judgment also clarifies an important distinction between defective notices and lawful termination.

While the Court accepted that the notice to quit pasted by the defendant lacked sufficient particulars under the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1886, it held that this defect was ultimately irrelevant.

The tenancy was terminated by the defendant’s actions on 16 June 2023 on the ground of illegal subletting, a breach that entitled termination without reliance on the defective notice.

This aspect of the ruling underscores that procedural missteps do not necessarily invalidate substantive rights where termination is otherwise justified.

On remedies, the Court adopted a restrained and evidence-driven approach.

Although the defendant succeeded in establishing lawful termination, most of the counterclaimed damages for reinstatement works and loss of use were disallowed for want of proof.

The Court reiterated the settled principle that special damages must be specifically pleaded and strictly proven. Invoices alone, unsupported by testimony from contractors or evidence distinguishing reinstatement from renovation, were insufficient.

This serves as a cautionary reminder that even successful parties must meet evidentiary standards when claiming monetary relief.

The only head of claim that succeeded was the pro-rated commission refund, grounded squarely in the tenancy agreement itself.

The Court rejected the claimant’s attempt to dispute this obligation while simultaneously relying on the same contract for its own claims.

This reflects a consistent judicial insistence on contractual coherence: parties cannot approbate and reprobate the same agreement to suit convenience.

While innovative housing models may respond to market demand, they remain subject to orthodox principles of property and contract law.

Courts will not permit business models to rewrite clear lease terms by implication, nor will they dilute landlords’ rights through informal practice alone. Consent, particularly where expressly required to be in writing, must be properly obtained.

At the same time, the decision reflects judicial balance.

The landlord’s right to terminate was upheld, but speculative or inadequately proven damages were curtailed. In this sense, the ruling reinforces predictability and fairness on both sides of the landlord–tenant relationship.

Ultimately, Case stands as a reminder that in commercial leasing, clarity is paramount.

Where parties choose certainty through written contracts, courts will enforce those bargains as written, not as subsequently rationalised.

In a legal landscape shaped by evolving residential practices, the judgment affirms that innovation in housing cannot come at the expense of contractual discipline.

Disclaimer: This content is published strictly for educational and informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, nor should it be relied upon as a substitute for professional legal counsel.

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Case Details:

Century Housing Services Pte Ltd v Koh Chiep Chong(Xu Jiecong)

[2026] SGMC 11 | Decision Date: 30 Jan 2026 | MC/OC 5281/2023

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