Supreme Court Restores Dismissal of CISF Personnel for Bigamy

The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the primacy of service discipline and the narrow limits of judicial review in disciplinary matters by setting aside the interference of the High Court in the dismissal of a Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) constable for contracting a second marriage during the subsistence of his first.

What's The Matter?

In this Case the Court held that once misconduct is clearly established under statutory service rules, courts exercising writ jurisdiction cannot dilute punishment merely on grounds of sympathy or perceived harshness.

The respondent was appointed as a Constable in the Central Industrial Security Force in 2006. A written complaint by his wife led to departmental proceedings alleging that he had married another woman in 2016 while his first marriage was still subsisting.

The charge squarely invoked Rule 18(b) of the CISF Rules, 2001, which prohibits a member of the Force from entering into a second marriage while having a living spouse, unless exempted by the competent authority.

A full-fledged departmental enquiry was conducted. The Enquiry Officer found the charges proved, noting that the second marriage was not disputed and that there was no exemption granted under the Rules.

The Disciplinary Authority imposed the penalty of dismissal from service, which was subsequently affirmed by the Appellate and Revisional Authorities.

The High Court, however, took a different view. Both the Single Judge and the Division Bench accepted that the misconduct was established, yet interfered with the penalty on the ground that dismissal was disproportionate.

Emphasising the financial hardship that would follow, the High Court directed the authorities to reconsider the punishment and impose a lesser penalty.

Allowing the Union of India’s appeal, the Supreme Court categorically rejected this approach.

The Court reiterated that under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, High Courts do not function as appellate authorities in disciplinary matters.

Their role is confined to judicial review examining the decision-making process, not the correctness of the decision itself.

Relying on settled precedent, the Court underscored that where an enquiry is conducted by a competent authority, in accordance with prescribed procedure, and supported by evidence, courts cannot reappreciate facts or substitute their own views on punishment.

Interference is permissible only where the penalty is so shockingly disproportionate that it defies logic or conscience.

The Court found no such perversity in the present case.

A key aspect of the judgment is the Court’s emphasis on the nature of disciplined forces.

The prohibition on bigamy under the CISF Rules was held to be a legitimate service condition rooted in institutional discipline, integrity, and public confidence.

Such rules are not moral injunctions but binding conditions of service, violation of which attracts defined consequences.

Where the rule is clear and unambiguous, courts cannot dilute its effect on considerations of equity or hardship.

Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex the law is harsh, but it is the law the Court held that unpleasant consequences flowing from violation of a statutory rule cannot justify judicial dilution of discipline.

Since no procedural irregularity or illegality was shown in the enquiry, the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the penalty.

The decision reinforces a consistent line of authority cautioning constitutional courts against transforming judicial review into appellate reassessment, particularly in matters concerning service discipline and misconduct in armed and paramilitary forces.