Job Denied Due to Disability? SC Backs Colour-Blind Driver’s Right to Alternate Work
- M.R Mishra
- Aug 4
- 3 min read
Updated: 4 days ago
In a decision that strikes at the intersection of labour rights, constitutional morality, and evolving disability jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has delivered a landmark judgment in CH. Joseph v. Telangana State Road Transport Corporation, quashing the arbitrary termination of a colour-blind driver and directing his reinstatement with pay protection and benefits.
What's The Matter?
Joseph was selected as a driver by the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation in 2014 a job that required rigorous medical screening, which he cleared. Yet, during a routine medical re-examination, he was declared colour-blind and deemed unfit to continue driving.
Instead of being reassigned, he was summarily retired in 2016, with a vague promise of “additional monetary benefit” under corporate circulars.
The case turned not only on the rules governing medical disqualification, but more importantly, on the binding force of a long-standing industrial settlement. Clause 14 of a 1979 Memorandum of Settlement (MOS) between the corporation and its recognised union expressly mandated that drivers found colour-blind during service be given alternate employment with protection of pay and continuity.
Despite this, the corporation chose to rely on later circulars and a 1986 agreement, arguing that the earlier clause had become obsolete.
What The Court Said?
The Court found otherwise. In a meticulous reading of the two settlements, the bench held that the 1979 clause being specific to colour blindness prevailed over the general language of the 1986 MOS.
The Court reaffirmed a cardinal principle of industrial jurisprudence: a later settlement cannot implicitly override a beneficial clause unless it expressly revokes it.
Here, the 1986 agreement neither contradicted nor annulled the earlier one. Instead, the corporation’s own records showed continued adherence to Clause 14 well beyond 1986, including through internal correspondence as late as 2014.
But what truly elevates this ruling is the Court’s refusal to reduce the issue to mere technicality. It faulted the corporation for failing to conduct even a basic assessment of Joseph’s fitness for other roles. No inquiry, no suitability review, not even a reply to his offer to work in a non-driving post like “Shramik” a clerical or depot-based role that does not require normal colour vision.
The Court declared this a serious breach of both statutory duty and constitutional values. Retirement must be a last resort, it held not a reflexive retreat when the employee becomes “inconvenient.”
Importantly, it reaffirmed that the obligation to offer alternate employment is not just an administrative courtesy, but a legally enforceable right one that flows from industrial settlements, labour law, and Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
The judgment also extends the principle of reasonable accommodation beyond the confines of the statutory definition of disability under the Persons with Disabilities Act. Citing Kunal Singh, Vikash Kumar, and Mohamed Ibrahim, the Court affirmed that acquired disabilities even if not statutorily recognised deserve protection under the broader canopy of equality and dignity.
Public employers, especially in transport and infrastructure sectors, cannot avoid their obligations by pointing to narrow policy definitions. If a worker can still work, then the employer must still try.
In a strong concluding note, the bench reminded that employer discretion ends where the employee’s dignity begins. It directed Joseph’s reinstatement in a suitable role within eight weeks, with 25% of arrears and full continuity of service.
This ruling is more than a win for one man; it is a message to all public sector employers. A medical certificate does not strip away a worker’s humanity. Disability is not disqualification not from work, and not from justice.
Disclaimer:This blog is for informational and Educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal concerns, please consult a qualified professional.
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