Beyond the Client: How Rondel v. Worsley Redefined an Advocate’s Duty

The landmark decision in Rondel v. Worsley remains one of the most contested intersections between legal ethics, public policy, and client rights.

Emerging from the peculiar circumstances of Norbert “Freddie the Ear” Rondel a man convicted in 1959 for grievous bodily harm who, years later, sued his barrister for negligence the case forced the House of Lords to confront whether an advocate could ever be held liable for professional missteps in court.

The ruling, delivered in 1967, entrenched the doctrine that barristers enjoy immunity from negligence claims for conduct in the course of litigation, not as a matter of contractual incapacity, but as a principle of public policy.

The Court’s reasoning was rooted in the advocate’s dual role: a fierce representative of the client, but also an officer of the court with overriding duties to justice, the legal system, and the public.

The fear was that, without immunity, counsel might abandon candour for overzealousness, prolong trials to shield against lawsuits, or compromise their duty to the court to appease clients.

This “duty to the court” rationale, while noble in aspiration, sits uneasily with situations where alleged negligence such as failing to ask key questions would not have conflicted with court obligations.

Still, the Lords insisted that preserving the implicit trust between Bench and Bar justified protecting advocates from the chilling effects of potential suits.

Courts also focused the undesirability of collateral re-trials. To permit negligence claims over criminal advocacy, they argued, would invite civil juries to re-litigate the merits of concluded prosecutions, undermining finality and clogging the justice system with “litigation upon litigation.”

This reasoning carried particular force in criminal law, where acquittals and convictions are intended to rest upon structured appeals, not the vagaries of later civil claims.

Yet the policy is far less persuasive in civil disputes, where re-litigation against one’s own counsel would not disturb the rights of the opposing party.

The decision also extended the immunity to solicitors when acting as advocates in court, though not for purely administrative or “paper” functions detached from litigation. The principle, the Court held, should attach to the role, not the professional title meaning any advocate, whether barrister or solicitor, enjoys the shield when performing advocacy work.

Critics have long pointed out that Rondel v. Worsley sacrifices individual redress at the altar of systemic efficiency, entrenching a professional privilege few other occupations enjoy. Supporters, however, see it as a necessary safeguard against the corrosive effect of hindsight-driven blame on the fearless independence of advocacy.

The tension between these positions has persisted, with subsequent reforms in some jurisdictions limiting or abolishing the immunity. But in its time, Rondel represented the high-water mark of the view that the public interest in the smooth, final, and dignified conduct of trials outweighs the private interest in holding advocates civilly accountable for their courtroom errors.